COMMANDERS DIGEST
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COMBAT READY

GUARD & RESERVE

COMBAT READY GUARD & RESERVE

By **WILL HILL TANKERSLEY, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)**

Our reliance upon the Guard and Reserve is the nexus of our Total Force Policy, a policy that we are practicing as well as advertising. Never before in the history of our Nation have the National Guard and Reserve assumed such an important role in our national strategy. The missions that the Reserve Components now share with their active force counterparts make it unmistakably clear that the national policy of the United States is one of reliance upon the Reserve Forces as the primary source of augmentation in any future crisis. There are two factors to assure this.

First, our defense policy requires forces-in-being—forces manned with people who are already trained. While the Selective Service machinery must be kept in good working order as a hedge against the possible need for general mobilization, the Selective Service cannot deliver, and the Armed Forces cannot train new personnel in much less than five months. Of course, the Selective Service/Induction Station/Training Center cycle does not produce deployable units in 150 days; all that is provided within that time frame is a recruit trained in a basic skill.

Forming these recruits into combat ready units that can be committed to a theater of conflict would consume additional months. It would be unrealistic and inconsistent to devise contingency plans which do not envision early deployment of our Reserve Forces.

The second factor that assures greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve is the markedly lower personnel and operating costs associated with Reserve Forces. This presupposes that Reserve Forces will be properly led, trained and equipped to undertake appropriate and valid missions. Today's manpower economics require that a sizable portion of our forces-in-being be National Guardsmen and Reservists. We must get the most for our manpower dollar, and greater dependence on the Reserve Forces is a way to help us do that. The value of our Guard and Reserve can be stated very positively—the Selected Reserve provides approximately 30 per cent of our military manpower. (See chart

TOTAL SELECTED RESERVE AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL DOD MILITARY MANPOWER
(As of June 30 Each Year)



below). The Selected Reserve, together with the Individual Ready Reserve, provides nearly 50 per cent of the trained manpower available to the country upon mobilization.

MANNING

The President's Budget for FY 1976 provides for a reduction in Selected Reserve strength as indicated in the Selected Reserve table at right. The reduction is primarily a result of a Naval Reserve restructuring that emphasizes hardware-oriented units and makes certain force structure changes as a result of equipment age/obsolescence and a decision to increase reliance on civil sector capabilities. The Army Reserve reduction will be discussed in a later section.

The same table expresses manpower strength authorizations in terms of fiscal year end strengths. Because average strength figures are required by the annual authorization language, it has been customary to express Selected Reserve drill-pay strengths in terms of average strength rather than end strength.

The other two tables at right display Selected Reserve manpower authorization requests in both forms for FY 1976, the three-month transition period FY 197T, and for the new fiscal year (FY 1977) ending September 30, 1977.

SELECTED RESERVE
(Minimum End-Strengths in Thousands)

	ACTUAL STRENGTH		FY 76 BUDGET REQUEST			
	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 7T	FY 1977
Army National Guard	386	403	400	400	400	400
Army Reserve	235	235	212	212	212	212
Naval Reserve	126	115	113	92	92	92
Marine Corps Reserve	37	31	32	33	33	36
Air National Guard	90	94	96	95	95	94
Air Force Reserve	44	46	52	53	54	55
Total DoD[1]	919	925	905	885	886	890

[1] Totals may not add due to rounding

AUTHORIZATION REQUEST
SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Minimum End Strength)

	FY 1976 (June 30, 1976)	FY 197T (Sept. 30, 1976)	FY 1977 (Sept. 30, 1977)
Army National Guard	400,000	400,000	400,000
Army Reserve	212,400	212,400	212,400
Naval Reserve	92,000	92,000	92,000
Marine Corps Reserve	32,911	33,284	35,784
Air National Guard	94,574	94,519	94,405
Air Force Reserve	53,210	53,743	55,240
Total DoD	885,095	885,946	889,829

AUTHORIZATION REQUEST
SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Annual Average Strength)

	FY 1976 (June 30, 1976)	FY 197T (Sept. 30, 1976)	FY 1977 (Sept. 30, 1977)
Army National Guard	400,000	400,000	400,000
Army Reserve	212,400	212,400	212,400
Naval Reserve	93,972	92,000	92,000
Marine Corps Reserve	32,481	33,013	34,699
Air National Guard	94,879	94,543	94,502
Air Force Reserve	51,789	53,642	54,395
Total DoD	885,521	885,598	887,996

Note: All figures are from FY 1976 President's Budget.

Personnel Strength Changes

Army National Guard

For the Army National Guard we are proposing an end strength of 400,000 as a minimum end strength for FY 1976. This will continue the capability of the ARNG to achieve a C-2 operational readiness level by providing an overall personnel manning of 93 per cent.

Army Reserve

For the Army Reserve we are proposing a minimum end strength of 212,400 in FY 1976, a drop of 12,600 based upon the FY 1975 Congressionally authorized average of 225,000. The proposed end strength could provide the USAR a C-1 manning capability for a few selected units. Other units would be manned at much lower levels.

During the early stages of preparation of the FY 1976 budget, a question arose with respect to the prospective heavy loss rates for the Army Reserve anticipated to occur in late FY 1975 and in FY 1976. Concern was also expressed as to whether or not the Army Reserve should maintain its normal personnel manning rate of 93 per cent (even assuming it were able to recruit adequate numbers) because of existing equipment shortages in certain units. We were also uncertain as to whether or not we really need all of the force structure presently in the Army Reserve. Consideration of these factors led us

This chart shows a chronology of manpower trends in the Selected Reserve over the past five and one-half years.



to the qualitative judgment that we should propose an average strength of about 212,400 for the Army Reserve for FY 1976.

Although Army Reserve recruiting has subsequently taken a turn for the better (holding steady since May 1974, at approximately 230,000), most of the increase in recruiting has come from the prior service sector. Non-prior service enlistments have continued their downward trend. We are currently examining the situation with an eye toward determining what the prior service/non-prior service mix should be.

Since there are a number of variables at play and since some questions still require answers (such as those relating to the basic force structure requirement), I would recommend that we stick with the 212,400 figure at this time. On the basis of recruiting capability alone, however, I think the Army Reserve could probably reach an average strength of 227,000 for FY 1976 and FY 197T.

Naval Reserve

For the Naval Reserve we are requesting a minimum end strength of 92,000 in FY 1976, a drop of 20,790 paid drill spaces based upon the FY 1975 Congressionally funded strength of 112,790. The lower minimum end strength request for FY 1976 reflects continuation of our efforts to restructure and validate Naval Reserve manpower force requirements into a carefully tailored and more responsive force. Principal reasons for the reduction in personnel strengths are: elimination of force structures and reduction in base support, operational staff groups, special and general support units and surface divisions. We believe that the proposed Naval Reserve strength will be adequate to support FY 1976 requirements. The Navy will soon complete an in-depth study of its force requirements for the Naval Reserve which may generate further changes in FY 1977.

Marine Corps Reserve

For the Marine Corps Reserve we are requesting a minimum end strength of 32,911 in FY 1976 compared to a June 30, 1974 actual end strength of 31,220. This end strength reflects the slow but steady successes in recruiting and retention. The current five-year manpower plan will enable the Marine Corps Reserve to attain 100 per cent of Selected Reserve manpower requirements by the end of FY 1978.

Air National Guard

For the Air National Guard we are requesting a minimum end strength of 94,574 in FY 1976. This reflects the retention in the budget of five Air National Guard flying units which, equipped with older aircraft, were proposed for elimination in FY 1975, but which have subsequently been retained as directed by the Congress and have been reequiped with other aircraft. The 94,574 end strength for FY 1976 provides better than 90 per cent manning for all units of the Air National Guard.

Air Force Reserve

For the Air Force Reserve we are requesting a minimum end strength of 53,210 in FY 1976. This end strength reflects minor increases within the Air Force Reserve program related primarily to the Strategic Airlift Enhancement program, to projected improvements in recruiting capability, and to the assignment of a part of the weather reconnaissance mission to the Air Force Reserve.

In keeping with the "airlift" amendment to the Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1975, we are taking steps to meet increased manpower requirements for strategic airlift by utilizing the crew resources available in the Air Force Reserve. We now plan a phased increase in the Reserve associate unit crew ratio to obtain a 25 per cent increase in sustained and surge capability in the C-141 and C-5 airlift fleet.

WILL HILL TANKERSLEY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)

President Ford nominated Will Hill Tankersley to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs on September 5, 1974. Mr. Tankersley was confirmed by the Senate on October 4, 1974, and sworn in by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger on October 21, 1974.

Prior to his appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr. Tankersley was Vice President and Director of Sterne, Agee and Leach, Inc., an Alabama New York Stock Exchange member firm.

Mr. Tankersley was born February 10, 1928, at Montgomery, Alabama. He attended The Citadel for two years before entering the United States Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1950. He later earned an M.S. in Economics from Auburn University.

He served eight years in the Regular Army and was an infantry officer in the Korean War. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He is a Colonel in the Army Reserve. For four years Mr. Tankersley was Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army for Alabama.

He was active in Montgomery civic and community affairs. He is married to the former Theda Clark Ball of Montgomery. They have three children: Will Jr., David, and Theda.

Phase I would:

- Authorize 2.25 crew ratio for the C-5 active force.
- Form an auxiliary force for both the C-5 and C-141 to fill the existing deficit in aircrew and maintenance manning.
- Concentrate effort on the Reserve associate recruiting and qualification program.

Phase II, based upon projected readiness, would increase authorization for the Reserve associate units as follows:

Fiscal Year	C-5	C-141
1977	1.5 Crew Ratio	1.75 Crew Ratio
1978	1.75 Crew Ratio	2.00 Crew Ratio

The significant force changes programmed for FY 1976 are:

Army Reserve Components

Both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve will continue to identify unneeded noncombat capability and, where possible, transfer it to combat forces. Personnel from 19 hospitals, 3 convalescent centers, 2 construction battalions and associated support forces are in this category.

This chart shows Selected Reserve strengths as of December 31, 1974. In the Army Reserve the cumulative actual average (231,332) and the actual month end strength (228,335) both exceed the Congressional floor (225,000).

SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS FY 1975



AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1974

Naval Reserve

Nine construction battalions will be eliminated as a result of increased reliance on the civil sector. Five NRF destroyers and nine coastal mine-sweepers will be retired because of age. Six carrier-based propeller-driven anti-submarine warfare (ASW) squadrons and two carrier airborne early warning squadrons will be eliminated because of obsolescence of aircraft and support capability.

The following will be transferred from active Navy to the Naval Reserve:

- Two amphibious transports (LPAs)
- One amphibious cargo ship (LKA)
- Eight patrol gunboats (PGs)
- One combat rescue helicopter squadron (HC)

The Naval Surface Reserve will provide 20 per cent of the manning for five additional active ASW ships.

Marine Corps Reserve

Modernization of Marine Corps Air Reserve flying units will continue with replacement of C-119s with KC-130s and F-8s with F-4s. Introduction of the Gama Goat rough terrain vehicle improves infantry mobility while introduction of the landing vehicle tracked personnel (LVTP-7) enhances amphibious capability.

Air National Guard

Modernization of flying units will continue with replacement of F-100s with A-7Ds. In FY 1976 and the outyears, a part of the strategic offensive mission will be transferred from active forces to the Reserves with assignment of KC-135 tankers. Strategic Air Command will be the gaining command for KC-135 refueling units. Placing the Reserves squarely in the strategic offensive mission is a prime example of our desire to achieve maximum utilization of the Reserve Components.

Air Force Reserve

The active forces will transfer to the Reserves one weather reconnaissance squadron of WC-130s (7-UE), which will go to Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

NPS REPS AWAITING TRAINING TOTAL DOD



The above chart shows the total number (15,588) of nonprior service (NPS) enlistees awaiting initial active duty training. 13,201 of the total are in an unpaid status.

GSLI

We are grateful to the Congress for extending full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance coverage to certain Reservists and we are appreciative of the expanded exchange privileges granted to our Reserve Forces. Public Law 93-508, the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, which provides job protection, equal employment and promotional opportunities to National Guardsmen and Reservists employed by State and local governments, the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission will assist Reserve Forces recruiting.

The Reserve Components have achieved a degree of recruiting success, primarily because of the continuing number of prior service individuals voluntarily joining the Selected Reserve. Recruiting replacements for those who will be leaving the Selected Reserve represents a formidable task and recruiting will continue to receive emphasis. New incentives may be required to assure enlistments in sufficient quantity and quality.

SELECTED RESERVE ACCESSIONS
TOTAL DOD



This chart shows accessions into the Selected Reserve. We are studying the mix between prior service and nonprior service accessions as we want to achieve the proper balance between the two. Prior service personnel require less training and thus enhance mobilization readiness; however, infusion of younger, nonprior service personnel is necessary to preclude great imbalance and to maintain a relatively young force.

Proposals to be included in the DoD Legislative Program for the 94th Congress that would assist the Reserve Components recruiting and retention effort include:

- Reserve Benefits Omnibus Legislation
- Reserve Retirement Modernization Act
- Reserve Officer Personnel Modernization Act
- Increase Retirement Point Credits
- Adjust Initial Active Duty for Training period.

The proposed legislation (DoD 94-11) that would amend the laws which require an individual to have four months' training before assignment outside the United States, its territories and possessions has special significance to the Reserve Components. In some instances, four months are not required to properly train a serviceman in a military skill and this legislative proposal would permit Reserve Component personnel to be released from initial active duty for training upon completion of basic training and training in a designated military specialty. The proposed legislation would provide dollar savings by reducing the time spent on initial active duty for training. The reduction in time spent away from home, job or school would increase the attractiveness of service in the Reserve Components. As an example, a parent might be willing to encourage a college-bound son or daughter to enlist in the Reserve Forces provided the youngster could complete training between the time high school ended in the Spring and college began in the Fall.

The single most important legislative proposal affecting the Reserve Components is DoD 94-3, a proposal to "enable the President to authorize the involuntary order to active duty of Selected Reservists, for a limited period, whether or not a declaration of war or national emergency has been declared."

Legislation to permit a rapid, low-threshold mobilization is imperative if the Guard and Reserve are to fulfill their vital role as the initial and primary augmentation for the active forces. By a rapid mobilization, I mean Presidential action to bring Reserve Component personnel to active duty in hours, not days and weeks. By low-threshold, I mean a partial mobilization that would beef up our response capability without risking the international impact of the often undesired political signal attendant with a Presidential declaration of a national emergency.

To make the Total Force Policy a believable policy—believable to all Americans, believable to allies and adversaries alike—we need the flexibility to augment our active forces by mobilizing up to 50,000 Guardsmen and Reservists under conditions short of a declared national emergency. Whereas unfavorable international misapprehensions and repercussions might occur as a result of a Presidential declaration of a national emergency in some future crisis, a low-key mobilization of a limited number of Reservists as a response to the same crisis might serve to help stabilize a deteriorating situation without increasing international tension.

The "Inoculation Theory" applies to this proposal. The Inoculation Theory postulates that in some future crisis, a little bit of mobilization could very well prevent the need for a full-scale mobilization. This legislation provides the flexibility needed to permit Guard and Reserve members to make an increased contribution to our defense posture and provides the credibility necessary for the active forces to know the Reserves will be available when needed. We clearly realize that such authority, if granted, must be used with the utmost caution and discretion, with our Reserves being mobilized only when the national interest absolutely demands it.

We have just initiated a new program designed to attract additional high school graduates into the Reserve Forces. This program will enable the Services to enlist and pay nonprior service high school graduates for inactive duty training performed in their Reserve units prior to undertaking initial active duty training. Last year a small program was designed to provide this incentive to students who were within 90 days of obtaining their high school diplomas. We hope that by expanding this program to enable high school graduates to participate in a drill pay status for up to 180 days of service, we will substantially increase the quantity and quality of non-prior service enlistees. If necessary, we will seek additional enlistment incentives.

MOBILIZATION READINESS

We have continued to press forward to improve Reserve readiness. The Secretary of Defense has demanded much quicker and more realistic response times from the Guard and Reserve in order that there can be a meaningful partnership between the active and Reserve components. The ever-expanding role we have assigned to the Guard and Reserve is a positive indicator that the Total Force Policy is a reality and not a myth.

Reserve Component goals for the immediate future center on five key issues:

- Assigning valid missions,
- Providing modern equipment,
- Instituting meaningful training,
- Improving readiness capability, and
- Establishing credibility.

The current mission of the Reserve

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Components is more time-sensitive than in the past, when a leisurely World War II type mobilization was contemplated. As the active Army builds to 16 divisions, three of the new divisions will have only two active brigades each instead of the normal complement of three. A separate brigade of the National Guard will be affiliated with each of those divisions for peacetime training and, upon mobilization of the National Guard brigades, will deploy and fight as an organic part of those divisions. Additionally, 22 separate maneuver battalions will affiliate with those active Army divisions which do not presently have a full complement of battalions in their active structure. Upon mobilization, these Reserve Component battalions will become organic parts of the active Army divisions. Eleven of our active Army divisions are dependent upon these mobilized Reserve Component battalions to achieve full maneuver capability. Twenty-five per cent of the combat power of these 11 active Army divisions is retained in the Reserve Component force structure during peacetime. Another seven separate Reserve Component brigades will affiliate with active Army divisions for training support in peacetime. In wartime, they can be deployed as a 4th brigade of the active division with which they are affiliated.

Beginning in FY 1976, the Reserve Forces assume a crucial role in our strategic offensive mission as the first of 128 KC-135 jet tanker aircraft are transferred from the active Air Force to the Reserve Forces.

Restructuring of the Naval Reserve will result in a hardware-oriented Reserve directly linked to combat missions. The Navy will transfer eight patrol combatants to the Naval Reserve and the Naval Air Reserve will assume an increased role in the air anti-submarine patrol mission. Naval Reservists will constitute 20 per cent of the allowance of some of the nondeploying active force ships. The Marine Corps Reserve is ready to fight as an integral force or to augment the active divisions where additional units might be needed.



This chart shows the nonprior service enlistment as a percentage of total accessions. Although nonprior service enlistments show an upward trend, they still fall short of programmed acquisitons.

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Equipping the Guard and Reserve is a continual challenge. Draw-downs on equipment resources to support Middle East, Vietnam, and other requirements have diminished programmed and potential equipment resources for the Guard and Reserve. Ground-to-air and anti-tank weapons; tanks, communications equipment and certain other equipment needed for the general purpose forces of the Army Guard and Reserve are either in short supply or, like the TOW anti-tank weapons, nonexistent.

Although progressing at a slower pace than originally anticipated, our modernization efforts continue. The Army has developed a program of increased production of the M-60 series of tanks and renovation of M-48s into M-48A5s which should result in an improved armor capability of the Army Guard and Reserve Forces, and the tank units of the Marine Corps Reserve.



This chart shows accessions for the first six months of FY 1975.

In the Air Guard and Reserve, the introduction of KC-135 tankers will move the Guard and Reserve forces into a new aircraft, even though the Air Guard has been performing the air refueling mission for about 10 years. Additional A-7Ds are being added to replace the aging F-100s in the Air Guard.

The Navy will continue to modernize the Reserve Fleet, and the next year will see amphibious transports (LPAs); amphibious cargo ships (LKAs) and patrol gunboats (PGs) in the surface Reserve for the first time. The air arm will gain additional rescue helicopters.

TRAINING

I have personally pledged to do all that I can to see that our Reserve Forces attain a level of training readiness commensurate with Total Force needs. Professional leadership, experience and technical skills are essential if meaningful training programs are to be devised and carried out. I include resourcefulness, imagination and initiative as elements of professional leadership. Every possible minute of training time must be devoted toward improving mission performance capability. Interesting and challenging training will aid our recruiting effort by attracting greater numbers of enlistees and by bringing into the Reserves high quality, properly motivated young men and women.

We are working closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller auditors and the General Accounting Office (GAO) to identify shortcomings in our training programs and then to take positive action to enhance our readiness posture. Incidentally, we have just received a draft report on Reserve Component training from the GAO. We believe this to be one of GAO's best analytical efforts and we expect it to be of considerable value to us in our quest to upgrade our training effort.

To enhance mobilization capabilities of the Reserve Components, DoD has increased overseas training of Reserve units and individuals during the past few years. Overseas training has allowed the Guard and Reserve to participate in Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed and joint exercises, to train in areas of scheduled deployment, and to receive specialized environmental training. However, recent actions by both the Senate and the House have resulted in drastic curtailment of overseas training for the Reserve Components. This restriction on overseas training could have an adverse impact upon the readiness of certain units, particularly those units for which no comparable alternate training can be provided. Accordingly, we are requesting that judicious movement be permitted between the 48 contiguous states, Puerto Rico, Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Canal Zone. Additionally, we are requesting authorization for Guard and Reserve

NPS MALE ACCESSIONS BY MENTAL CATEGORY TOTAL SELECTED RESERVE

MENTAL CATEGORY	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
I	31,006	17,298	10,273	5,158	1,780
	17.3%	17.2%	12.4%	9.8%	4.4%
II	80,739	40,999	31,312	15,963	7,961
	45.1%	40.8%	37.8%	30.3%	19.8%
III	58,964	34,696	34,054	22,729	18,150
	32.9%	34.5%	41.1%	43.2%	45.1%
IV	8,065	6,892	6,545	7,682	10,736
	4.5%	6.9%	7.9%	14.6%	26.7%
UNKNOWN	450	684	666	1,118	1,575
	.2%	.6%	.8%	2.1%	4.0%
TOTAL	179,224	100,569	82,850	52,650	40,202
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

This chart displays the pivotal change in mental categories of nonprior service male enlistees. In order to qualify for enlistment in the Reserve Forces, every enlistee must meet the mental standards established for his proposed duty assignment. The majority of male nonprior service enlistees are in Mental Categories I, II, and III — the average and above average mental groups. The 10,736 Category IVs enlisted in FY 1974 represent only slightly over one per cent of our total Selected Reserve strength.

participation in joint exercises and environmental training at specified mobilization sites.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve continues to promote improved understanding and appreciation of the Guard and Reserve throughout the employer community. James M. Roche, the chairman, and his large team of volunteer assistants throughout the Nation, have done a masterful job of assuring our citizen-military members the freedom to participate in Guard and Reserve training without loss of job security or other benefits. To date, over 48 million employees have been covered through this program.

The committee recently established an "ombudsman" program through which individual employer problems can be resolved. Word has gone out to members of the Guard and Reserve to feel free to contact the "ombudsman" with such problems if

NPS MALE ACCESSIONS BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TOTAL SELECTED RESERVE

EDUCATION	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
SOME COLLEGE & COLLEGE GRADS	97,408	52,581	31,350	12,905	2,297
	54.3%	52.3%	37.8%	24.5%	5.7%
H.S. GRADS	71,698	40,080	38,769	22,541	15,514
	40.0%	39.9%	46.8%	42.8%	38.6%
NON H.S. GRADS	10,118	7,908	12,731	16,579	21,406
	5.7%	7.8%	15.4%	31.5%	53.2%
UNKNOWN	———	———	———	625	985
				1.2%	2.5%
TOTAL	179,224	100,569	82,850	52,650	40,202
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

This chart shows the educational levels of nonprior service male accessions. The education level of the total Selected Reserve remains good, although there has been a significant decrease in the percentage of nonprior service male enlistees having some college-level education and a similarly large increase in the number of non-prior service male enlistees having no high school diploma.

they cannot be resolved at the employee or unit commander level. When the committee receives such requests, they are assigned to a local volunteer member who, in turn, visits with the employer to discuss the matter. The results thus far have been excellent and have proven what can be accomplished through communication.

TOTAL FORCE STUDY

The Total Force study is in its final stages—we are at the point where we are attempting to reach a consensus on a unified DoD position. This comprehensive study of the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force examines organization, equipment, readiness and its fundamental limits, deployment objectives, management, and possible trade-offs between active and Reserve components. Although this study has taken longer than we anticipated, our results should be available to Congress very soon. There has been a lot of soul searching in this, but I trust the results will merit what has proven to be a rather exhaustive effort. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense has already forwarded to the Congress his recommendations on the feasibility of merging the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.

As with our active forces, the Reserve Components must periodically be converted, redesignated and reorganized to conform to the changing concepts of warfare. Such changes are necessary and vital to the maintenance of a virile and effective Reserve Force. We will continue to scrutinize Reserve missions to ensure their necessity and we will continue to examine active force functions and missions to identify those which might be shifted to the Reserves.

BLACK PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECTED RESERVE
DOD TOTALS



This chart shows black participation in the Selected Reserve. Black participation has increased steadily in each of the Reserve Components. The goal in minority recruiting is to achieve the degree of participation in each unit that reflects the character of the population residing within the geographic area of the unit.

FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECTED RESERVE
DOD TOTALS



This chart shows female participation in the Selected Reserve. Opportunities for female participation in the Reserve Components have been greatly expanded by encouraging enlistment for service in numerous occupational fields previously closed to females.

SUMMARY

The degree of force interdependence we are creating as we integrate the Army Reserve Components with the active Army, and as we increase our dependence on the Air Guard and Reserve for airlift, tactical air, and now for strategic offense, and as we create a hardware-oriented Naval Reserve that is directly linked to combat missions, means that we must improve readiness and capability of our Reserve Forces. A trained Reserve Force with swift response capability constitutes a significant and a credible portion of our overall defense posture. By maintaining a Total Force—active and Reserve—that has the clear capacity to deploy rapidly in a crisis situation, we both reduce the chance of our forces being needed and assure ourselves of a better outcome if they are.

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